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Abstract
Network coding is a viable alterative to traditional routing methods that are be-
ing used in current data networks as it offers many advantages, including higher
throughput rates and lower network costs. Although research has been conducted
with regards to the cost and security issues of network coding, a joint investigation of
these two parameters has not been done yet, thus providing the motivation for this
thesis.
For this thesis, we consider the situation where a set of messages is to be mul-
ticasted across the network, of which a known subset is of interest to a wiretapping
adversary. The problem that we attempt to solve is to find a network coding scheme
that has both a low network cost and a low probability of the wiretapper being able
to retrieve all the messages of interest.
We make use of random linear codes in anticipation for decentralized implementa-
tion of the scheme, and focus on the problem of finding the multicast subgraph. As an
exact algorithmic solution is difficult, we propose two heuristic solutions, and compare
their performances to traditional routing through a simulation study on Rocketfuel
networks. Our results suggest that network coding can be more effective than routing
for this low cost and secure data multicast problem, especially when the links are not
easily tapped.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Network coding
In current communication networks, information is usually transmitted using a rout-
ing scheme, where data packets are sent from their places of origin to their destina-
tions without being modified intentionally at their intermediate locations. As routing
schemes are unable to always achieve the maximum information throughput of a
network, Ahlswede et. al. [1] suggested a different data transfer scheme, now com-
monly known as "network coding," that can always achieve the maximum throughput
through intentional modifications to the data packets within the network.
Consider the famous network coding example shown in Figure 1.1(a), where each
directed edge has unit capacity. Suppose we need to transmit two bits of information,
bl and b2 , from the source node s to each of the two sink nodes tl and t 2. Ahlswede
et. al. showed that routing is unable to send these two data bits to their destinations
in one single time step. Figure 1.1(b) shows an example of a routing scheme that is
unable to send b2 to ti, primarily because the edge 3 - 4 has already been used to
transmit bl. However, network coding can be used to accomplish this data transfer
as illustrated in Figure 1.1(c), where '+' denotes a modulo 2 addition. At tl, b2 can
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1.1: (a) A sample network. (b) A routing scheme where b2 is unable to reach
tl. (c) A network coding scheme where both sink nodes can receive both messages.
be recovered from bl and bl + b2 by taking their difference (modulo 2), and a similar
argument follows at t2.
The paper by Ahlswede et. al. triggered much research interest, and many papers
have since been published for the better understanding of network coding. For in-
stance, Li et. al. [2] proved that linear network codes over a large enough finite field
is sufficient for multicast connections, while Ho et. al. [3] demonstrated that random
linear network codes are able to support a data multicast with decreasing failure rates
as the size of the finite field increases. In addition, Koetter and Medard [4] presented
an algebraic framework to analyze network codes, and used it both to recapture past
results and to show some new ones. For instance, they applied their framework to
non-multicast situations and they also showed that the use of a single network code
is sufficient even in a network with delays.
1.2 Cost concerns in network coding
Although network coding can achieve higher data throughput rates than routing,
there are other aspects of communication that are important to network users.
One important performance parameter is the network cost incurred for a given
set of connections. While the minimum cost multicast problem in routed networks
requires the finding of a directed Steiner tree, which is NP-hard, the same problem
in coded networks can be solved by a linear program in polynomial time [5], and also
be implemented in a decentralized manner [6]. In addition, simulation results have
shown that network coding can provide the multicast connections at a lower cost than
traditional routing [6], [7].
1.3 Security concerns in network coding
Another important performance parameter is the security of the network. In this area,
Cai and Yeung [8] considered the problem of using network coding to achieve perfect
information security against wiretappers. In a separate paper, Feldman et. al. [9]
showed that the finding of a matrix for the construction of an optimal secure network
code is equivalent to the finding of a linear code with certain generalized distance
properties. In a different setting, Ho et. al. [10] showed that randomized network
coding is useful in detecting Byzantine modification of data packets, thus providing
data security against Byzantine attackers who arbitrarily modify data packets in the
network.
The remaining part of this section details the research work done by Cai and
Yeung [8] and Feldman et. al. [9], as the notion of network security for this thesis is
based primarily on their work.
In both papers, the researchers considered the problem of sending a single data
stream X from its origin to its destinations, while ensuring perfect information se-
curity [16] against a wiretapping adversary. Mathematically, we say that perfect
information security is achieved if, for any set of messages atpped that is retrieved by
the adversary, the conditional entropy of X given Ytapped, is the same as the entropy
of X : (A short summary about information theory and entropy is given in section
2.4.)
H(X I apped) = H(X).
In [8], it was assumed that a collection of sets of edges, W = {Aj,...,AIdl} is
known, and that the wiretapper can only tap the edges in one of its elements, Aj.
Feldman et. al. [9] removed this assumption and generalized the problem to one where
the wiretapper can tap at most 0 edges in the network.
In both papers, the authors achieved perfect information security by first encoding
the data stream X with a random, independent data stream at the source node before
transmission. Figure 1.2 shows an example of such a secure network code on the
network discussed earlier, assuming that the wiretapper can tap at most one link in
the network (i.e. i = 1). In the figure, b is a single bit message that is to be sent
securely from s to tl and t 2 , while w is the single bit encrypting message.
From the figure, it is easy to verify that the wiretapper can only retrieve one of
the three types of messages sent in the network, namely w, b + w and b - w. Since b
and w are independent, it follows that:
H(b I w) = H(b).
In addition, similar to the situation where the one-time pad is able to provide perfect
Figure 1.2: An example of a secure network code on the previous sample network,
assuming that the wiretapper can access at most one link in the network. b denotes
the secure message to be transmitted, while w denotes the encrypting message.
information security, we have:
H(bl b + w) = H(b) and
H(b b- w) = H(b).
Thus, it follows that the network coding scheme shown in Figure 1.2 can achieve
perfect information security against the wiretapper who can tap at most one network
link.
1.4 Limitations to previous secure network coding
scheme
Although the secure network coding scheme developed in [8] and [9] can provide
perfect information security against the wiretapper, there are some limitations that
we would like to point out and resolve in this thesis.
First, as it may be difficult to know the maximum number of links that are ac-
b-1 +w
Figure 1.3: An example of a network where a secure network code does not exist.
Suppose the message b is to be securely sent from s, to both tl and t2 , and that the
wiretapper is capable of tapping any one link in the network. In this situation, no
secure network code exists according to the previous schemes.
cessible to the wiretapper, we will instead assume that the wiretapper can tap each
network link (i, j) with some probability pij, and that this set of probabilities is known
for the whole network. This assumption is more realistic in application as it is usually
easier to estimate or know this set of probabilities than the maximum number of links
accessible to the wiretapper.
Second, although it is always desirable to have perfect information security, such
a requirement may not always be necessary, or even possible. In some applications,
it may be permissible to allow the wiretapper to receive some parts of the secure
message. In other situations, such perfectly secure network codes may simply not
exist.
Consider the network shown in Figure 1.3, where some message b is to be securely
sent from sl to both tl and t2 , and that the wiretapper is capable of tapping any one
link in the network. Since there is only one data path from si to t2 , in order for t2
to receive the message, the message b must be sent along the path sl -- 1 -- 2 -+ t2
in an uncoded manner. In such a situation, the wiretapper will always be able to
retrieve the message b, as long as the tapped link lies on this critical data path.
With these considerations, instead of requiring that the wiretapper receive no
information about the set of secure messages, we shall seek to achieve partial network
security by trying to reduce the probability that the wiretapper is able to retrieve the
full set of secure messages.
With this definition of network security, although the wiretapper can potentially
receive a significant amount of information about the secure message, this does not
mean that the security of the message is in serious jeopardy. This is because the
purpose of' this thesis is not to come up with a secure network coding scheme to
replace the current standards of ensuring message security, but to come up with one
that can further enhance message security. Thus, even if the wiretapper manages to
retrieve all the necessary parts of the secure message, he will still need to overcome
the other message security measures, such as cryptography and steganography. As a
result, the aim of achieving partial network security is not a meaningless one.
Finally, as there are usually cost and throughput concerns associated with the
issue of data transmission, it is desirable to address these concerns as well. For the
previous secure network coding scheme, some random stream of encrypting data (e.g.
bit w in Figure 1.2) must be transmitted across the network as well, which inevitably
lowers the overall useful throughput of the network. In general, as the value of b
increases, more encrypting data must be sent across the network, which inevitably
lowers the throughput rate of useful information. This transmission of the encrypting
data also increases the overall network cost, and is usually undesirable in situations
where network resources are precious or scarce. Hence, while it is important to ensure
a high level of security, there is also a need to maintain a low overall network cost.
1.5 Combining cost and security concerns in net-
work coding
Having identified the limitations of the previous secure network coding scheme, we
intend to come up with a partially secure network coding scheme that also tries to
keep the network cost low. Thus, for this problem, two network parameters will be
of primary interest, namely network cost and network vulnerability.
For this thesis, we shall consider the situation where a set of messages is to be
multicasted across the network, of which a known subset is of interest to a wiretapper.
The problem that we attempt to solve is to multicast the messages at a low cost, while
keeping the network vulnerability - defined as the probability that the wiretapper
is able to retrieve all the messages of interest - low. While network security is
not limited to the resilience of the network against wiretapping, the other notions of
security are beyond the scope of this work.
In general, we expect the existence of a tradeoff between network cost and network
vulnerability, and thus, a joint minimization of both parameters is usually impossible.
For instance, in routed networks, a cheapest cost approach to a unicast connection
usually selects a single path. However, when the connection is to be resilient against
wiretapping, multiple disjoint paths may be needed, which may increase the network
cost [11], [12], [13], [14].
To illustrate further this trade-off and to show that network coding has the po-
tential of achieving a lower network vulnerability than traditional routing, consider
the network shown in Figure 1.5(a) where each network link has unit capacity and
unit cost. Two random processes (denoted X 1 and X2) are to be multicasted from
the source nodes s1 and s2 to the sink nodes t, and t2 , against a wiretapper who is
interested in obtaining the random process X 1. The probability that any one partic-
(a) A simple network
(b) Single path routing (c) Single path network coding
(d) Multipath routing (e) Multipath network coding
Figure 1.4: A simple network to illustrate the tradeoff between network cost and
vulnerability.
ular link is tapped is 0.01, and edges are assumed to be tapped independently of one
another.
Figures 1.5(b) to 1.5(e) show four different methods of achieving the multicast,
and Table 1.1 shows the corresponding network costs and vulnerabilities. In Figures
1.5(b) and 1.5(c), each process is transmitted at unit rate, while in Figures 1.5(d)
and 1.5(e), each process Xi is transmitted at a rate of two by splitting it into two
processes Xil and Xi2.
Figure 1.5(b) shows the single path routing solution that minimizes the network
cost, while Figure 1.5(c) shows the non-trivial single path network coding solution
Table 1.1: Network costs and vulnerabilities for the simple network of Figure 1.5.
Average cost Network
(per bit) Vulnerability
Single path routing 2 0.020
Single path coding 3.5 0.010
Multipath routing 2.75 5.9 x 10- 4
Multipath coding 2.75 2.1 x 10- 5
(note that the trivial solution is identical to the routing solution). Figure 1.5(d) shows
the multipath routing solution and Figure 1.5(e) shows the multipath network coding
solution.
From this simple example, we see that, while the single path routing solution
offers the lowest network cost, it also results in the highest network vulnerability.
While the network vulnerability can be reduced by employing network coding or
multipath routing, the network cost inevitably increases. It should also be noted that
the multipath network coding solution returns the lowest network vulnerability, at a
cost equal to that of multipath routing.
1.6 Thesis outline
The organization for the rest of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 establishes the
mathematical models to be used in this thesis, while Chapter 3 defines the problem
to be solved in a mathematical framework and discusses the general solution to the
problem. As the general solution is difficult, two heuristic approaches to the problem
are presented in this chapter as well. Chapter 4 describes the setup used for the
simulations and details the results obtained from them. Finally, a conclusion is given
in Chapter 5, together with possible avenues for future work.
Chapter 2
Model
This chapter describes the various mathematical models used in this thesis. The first
section expands on the network model presented in [5] for the finding of the coding
subgraph. The second section describes the network model presented in [4] for the
establishment of a linear network code.
As linear network codes are sufficient for multicast [2], and random linear network
codes have the advantage of being implementable in a decentralized manner, we
chose to make use of random linear codes. The random linear network coding model
described in the original paper by Ho et. al. [3] is reproduced in the third section of
this chapter.
The last section of this chapter describes information security under an informa-
tion theoretic framework, and establishes the security criterion to be used henceforth.
2.1 Network model for finding the coding subgraph
A communication network is represented by a directed graph G = (V, E), where V
is the set of vertices (or nodes) and E is the set of directed edges (or links). With
each edge (i,j) E E, we associate two non-negative numbers cij and dij, which are
the cost per unit flow and the link capacity, respectively. For simplicity, each edge is
assumed to have infinite capacity (dij -+ 00 V (i, j) E E). We say that edge (i, j) is
an outgoing link of node i and an incoming link of node j. In addition, we say that
for the edge (i, j), node i is its tail and node j is its head.
In this network, a set of r discrete independent random processes Y = {W1, ... , W,}
is to be transmitted to a fixed set of sink nodes, T = {tl,... , tJTl } C V. Each random
process Wi is generated at the source node sw,, and is assumed to have a constant
integer entropy rate of p. Thus, it can be arbitrarily well approximated by p inde-
pendent random processes, each with unit entropy rate. We denote the j-th such
component of Wi as the random process Xp(i_l)+j, and we denote the source node of
process Xi as sx,. We let X = {X1,... ,Xr,} be the set of mutually independent
source processes with unit entropy rates.
In the network, there exists an adversary who is interested in obtaining all the
messages in a given subset of #W. We denote this subset of messages as #,nterest and
assume without loss of generality that it contains the first k random processes (i.e.
0,,nterest = {W 1 ,..., Wk}, k <_ r). In terms of the unit entropy rate source processes,
we say that the adversary is interested in the processes in ,interest = {X 1,... , XkpP}.
This adversary is able to tap network links and retrieve all the messages that are
being transmitted along them. To model this wiretapping behavior, we associate with
each edge (i, j), a number pij E [0, 1] to denote the probability that the wiretapper will
be able to retrieve the message(s) sent along it. For simplicity, the tapping events of
different network links are assumed to be independent (but the outputs of all tapped
links are considered jointly when we consider the vulnerability of the network).
2.2 Network model for linear network codes
To aid in the description of the random linear network coding model in the following
section, a different graph representation of the network is required. Specifically, we
represent the coding subgraph as the graph G' = (V, E'), where each edge 1' E E' has
unit capacity, and links with greater capacities are modeled as parallel edges in E'.
In the network, edge 1' carries the random process Y(l'), and each sink t E T re-
ceives a set of output random processes {Z(t, i)}. We denote the set of all transmitted
random processes as 3 = Ul',E,{Y(l')}, and we denote the random set of all tapped
messages as YRtapped = UEIE'app {Y(l')} C Y, where Etapped C E' is the random set of
edges that are successfully tapped by the wiretapper. It is assumed that information
is transmitted as vectors of bits of length u, represented as elements in the finite field
F 2 u .
For a delay-free network, we can represent each of the random processes Xi, Y(l')
and Z(t, i) as a sequence of symbols from F2u. Specifically, we can represent Xi as the
sequence Xi == {X(o),Xi),...}, Y(l') as the sequence Y(l') = {Y(0)(l'), Y( 1)(l'),...}
and Z(t, i) as the sequence Z(t, i) = {Z()(t, i), Z( 1)(t, i),.. .}.
For a network with delays, we represent it as the graph G' where every edge has
unit time delay, using an appropriately chosen time unit. Links with greater delays
are modeled as a series of edges in the graph (e.g. a link with a delay of t time units
is represented as a series of t edges in the graph). Similar to the delay-free case, each
of the random processes Xj, Y(l') and Z(t, i), can be represented by a sequence of
symbols from F2 u.
2.3 Random linear network coding model
In anticipation of a completely distributed implementation of the secure network
coding scheme, we make use of random linear network codes [3], which are not only
sufficient for multicast [2], but are also easily implementable in a decentralized manner
[6].
For a link 1' with node v as its tail, we say that the signal Y(l') is a random linear
combination of the processes generated at v and the signals carried by the incoming
links of v. In the case where all the links are delay-free, we can express Y(l') as:
Y(1') = E ai,,Xi + f,, ,Y(j'),
{iE[1,rpl: sxi=v} {j'EE': head(j')=v}
where aij, and fj,,i, are uniformly and randomly chosen from the finite field F2U.
Similarly, the output process Z(t, i) at sink node t is a random linear combination
of the signals carried by its incoming links, and can be expressed as follows in the
delay-free case:
Z(t, i) =, Y (1
{l'EE': head(l')=t}
where byt,, is uniformly and randomly chosen from the finite field F2U.
For networks with link delays, memory is needed at the receiver nodes, but mem-
oryless operations at all other nodes will suffice [4]. The symbol of Y(l') at time
7 + 1, denoted as Y('+1)(I'), is a random linear combination of the symbols that are
accessible at node v = tail(l') one time step earlier at time 7. Mathematically, we
can express Y(7+')(l') as:
Y(+l)(I+') = a, x •
-) + Ef,,'Y,()(J').
{iE [1,rpj: sx i =v} {j'eE ': head(j')=v}
At the sink nodes, if a memory of m is made available for each output process at
the sink nodes, we can then express the symbol of Z(t, i) at time 7 + 1 as:
m
=Ebj'(uZ(-r-) (t,i) +
Oti,,
u=O
m
{l'EE'E: head(1')=t} u=0
where b~i, and b") are uniformly and randomly chosen from the finite field F2u.
These equations can be represented algebraically in terms of a delay variable D
as follows:
= S aj,'Xj(D) +
{iE[1,rp]: sxi=v}
E
{j'EE': head(j')=v}
: headl
{l'EE': head(l')=t}
where:
Da ,,
m
E Du+lb"(u)
u=O
1 - E Du+lb'(u)
u= 
ti,l
v=O
and
00
= X r)DT,
r=0
00oo
=7
r=0
y('r) (l')DT ,
00
= 5z(r)(t,i)Dr,
Y() (l') = 0,
Z(0)(t, i) = 0.
The coding coefficients {a,y,, fjy,'l, bti., E F2u } can be consolidated into rp x IE'I
z(r") (t, i)
Y(l')(D)
Z(t, i)(D)
X,(D)
Y(l')(D)
Z(t, i)(D)
Dfj,.vY(j')(D),
btc ,Y(l')(D),
matrices A = (ai,l,) and Bt = (bt,,,,), and the IE'I x IE'I matrix F = (fjy,l,). The
matrix A can be thought of as the transfer matrix from the source processes Xi to
the link processes Y(l'). Similarly, the matrix B can be thought of as the transfer
matrix from the link processes Y(l') to the output processes Z(t, i).
The triple (A, F, B) where:
BtITI
uniquely defines the linear network code used for the network. From the results in
[4], the connection problem is said to be feasible with the triple (A, F, B) if and only
if the matrix AMB T has full rank for each receiver t, where:
(I - F)- 1 = I + F + F 2 + ...
(I -DF)-1 = I+ DF + D2F2 +...
in the case without delays,
in the case with delays.
2.4 Information security model
For a random variable X(t), its entropy H(X(T)), can be computed as follows:
H(X(')) = - p log2Px,
where p, denotes the probability that the random variable X (') takes on the value x.
For each random process Xi = {Xo ) ,  , ... , x(Ixi)}, we can approximate it
arbitrarily well by a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sym-
M 
=
bols, because compression can be done at the source nodes to reduce redundancy in
the transmitted sequence. As a result, the entropy of the random process Xi can be
expressed as:
H(Xi) = ZH(X ()).
Since it was assumed that the random processes in = {X1,..., Xrp} are mutu-
ally independent, we can express the conditional entropy of Xi, given Xj, as follows:
H(Xi I Xj) {H(X) if i j,
0 ifi=j.
Then, for the set of messages of interest to the wiretapper, its entropy is defined
as:
H(Xinterest) = H(Xi)
{XiE&interest}
kp
= ZH(Xi).
i=1
Now, suppose the wiretapper obtains some of the messages that are sent in the
network. Denoting this set of tapped messages as /apped, we say that the conditional
entropy of finterest given iapped is H( ~nterest I apped).
In effect, this conditional entropy provides us the answer to the question: "Given
that the wiretapper has retrieved all the messages in tapped, how much information
about the messages in •interest is he still missing?" In order for the wiretapper to
retrieve the full identities of all the messages in Xnteret, he will need to make a guess
out of 2 H(• • nterest I tapped) possibilities.
The next thing to note about the conditional entropy H( ,interest I apped) is
that it is always a non-negative value, and it can never exceed the entropy value of
Knterest. Thus, the following inequality holds:
0 < H(interest I ýrapped) < H(•interest)-
From the interpretation of the conditional entropy, it follows that as the value of
H(•interest tapped) increases, the level of network security increases, as the wire-
tapper needs to make a guess out of an increasing number of possibilities. However,
from the above inequality, it follows that the conditional entropy is at most equal to
H(Xinterest). As the set of tapped messages is random, we say that perfect informa-
tion security is achieved when the following equation holds for any realization of the
set gtapped:
H( Xnterest I tapped) = H( xinterest)-
This notion of perfect information security is the aim of the papers [8] and [9],
and as explained earlier, it may be too strict in application, and thus, a weaker
security criterion is used for this thesis. Specifically, we consider the worst case
scenario, whereby the conditional entropy H(iinterest I apped) is equal to zero,
which is equivalent to saying that the wiretapper is able to retrieve all the messages
in the set Xnterest without having to make any arbitrary guesses. Since tapped is
a random set, we define the network vulnerability as the probability that the worst
case scenario happens:
v := Pr[H(fiznterest I 3(apped) = 0]. (2.1)
With this weaker notion of network security, there are times when the adversary is
able to obtain some, or even all, of the messages of interest.
Given a network code (A, F, B), and a fixed realization of the random set E'apped,
we say that the wiretapper is able to fully retrieve all the k messages of interest if
and only if there exists a rp x IE'I matrix Btapped = (bi,l,) where:
1. bil, EF2- ViE[1, rp], I' EE'.
2. bi,l, = 0 V l' Etapped.
3. The rp x rp matrix Q = AMB Iped = (wij) can be represented in the block
form:
= 1,1 Q1,2
[2,1 2,2
where the submatrices have the following properties:
(a) Q1,1 has dimensions kp x kp, and is invertible.
(b) Q1,2 has dimensions kp x (r - k)p, and is a null matrix.
(c) Q 2,1 has dimensions (r - k)p x kp, and is a null matrix.
(d) Q2,2 has dimensions (r - k)p x (r - k)p, and is a null matrix.
Although the notion of network security can be strengthened by defining the net-
work vulnerability as the probability that the conditional entropy H(Xinterest I tapped)
exceeds a certain threshold amount, such a definition will inevitably complicate the
computation of the network vulnerability.
Since there are kp processes of interest in interest, if we were to say that network
security is compromised when m or more of these kp processes are fully retrieved,
then it follows that the total number of scenarios that will need to be considered is
k•m (kp), which generally scales exponentially with kp. Thus, for simplicity, we only
concern ourselves with the single scenario where all the messages are compromised
(i.e. H(Xinterest I tapped) = 0).
Chapter 3
Problem Formulation and Solution
This chapter first defines the problem to be solved in this thesis, before making a
remark about the previous secure coding scheme described in section 1.3. Following
this, the third section of this chapter describes the general solution to the problem,
and discusses some of the difficulties associated with it. As the general solution is
difficult, heuristics are needed for the solving of the problem and two heuristics to
the problem are discussed in the last two sections.
3.1 Problem formulation
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is concerned with the problem of coming up with a
secure network coding scheme that takes into account both network cost and network
vulnerability.
For the network cost, we consider the graph G = (V, E) where each edge (i, j) E E
has a cost per unit flow of cij. Thus, if zij denotes the amount of information flow on
the edge (i, j) E E, it then follows that the total network cost is given by:
S :=-- Cij ij
{(i,j)EE}
For the network vulnerability, as mentioned in section 2.4, we define the network
vulnerability as the probability that the wiretapper is able to retrieve all the messages
in the set Yfinterest (or equivalently, in terms of the unit entropy rate source processes:
9 interest). Mathematically, the network vulnerability is given by Equation 2.1.
With the network cost and vulnerability defined as such, the problem to be solved
is to minimize some function F(y, v), which is assumed to be an increasing function
of both y and v. Once again, as we expect a trade-off between network cost and
network vulnerability, it is often inadequate to minimize only p or v.
3.2 Using other messages in the network to pro-
vide security
From the previous secure coding scheme described in section 1.3, we observe that
information security is achieved through two main steps. First, the secure message
has to be encrypted by a random, independent message at the source. Second, the
messages to be transmitted on the network links themselves must be such that the
wiretapper does not obtain any information about the secure message from the net-
work links that he can tap.
On closer examination, one will notice that this source encryption is very similar
to the concept of network coding. Returning to Figure 1.2, we see that the secure
message b is encrypted with a random, independent message w that is generated at
the source node s. Now, suppose that the network shown in Figure 1.2 is just a
section of a larger network, and let us further suppose that w is not a random data
stream generated at s, but is, instead, another message that is to be transmitted in
the network via the network node s. With these assumptions, the network code shown
in Figure 1.2 will still apply, and perfect information security against the wiretapper
is achieved in this section of the network.
This similarity between source encryption and the mixing of messages in network
coding shows that data security can also be achieved by using other messages in the
network as encrypting messages. The main advantage of using other messages for
encryption is that there is no longer a need to transmit random streams of encrypting
data that lower useful network throughput and increase the total network cost.
For this thesis, as network cost is of significant importance, we ignore the pos-
sibility of increasing network security at the expense of increased network cost by
introducing random data streams into the network. Thus, we restrict ourselves to the
minimization of the function F(p, v) without introducing additional messages into
the network.
Here, it should be noted that despite restricting ourselves to the minimization of
.F(1u, v) without introducing additional messages, one can still investigate the effect
of introducing random data streams into the network by keeping the set of messages
of interest Xinterest fixed, while increasing the size of the set of source processes X.
3.3 General solution
We separate our secure coding problem into two parts. The first part deals with
the finding of the coding subgraph, including the amount of information flow to be
put onto each network link. The second part involves the actual network code to be
implemented in the coding subgraph. The network code describes how data packets
interact with one another, and is important to ensure that the original messages can
be decoded at the sink nodes.
In anticipation of a distributed implementation of the solution, we make use of
random linear network codes, which are sufficient for multicast [2]. (The random
coding model is described in section 2.3.) With this decision, we turn our attention
to the problem of finding the coding subgraph in G = (V, E).
Since every sink node in T needs to receive all the random processes in Y', we can
translate this multiple multicast problem into a single multicast one by introducing
a pseudo-source node a, and r pseudoedges (a, swi) into the graph G. The pseudo-
source node generates all the processes in Yf and transmits them to the actual source
nodes sw 1,..., swr via the pseudoedges (a, sw,) that have zero cost per unit flow (i.e.
cij = 0, Vi = a).
Noting that the problem of finding the minimum cost subgraph for a single mul-
ticast connection can be cast as a linear programming problem [5], we structure the
subgraph finding problem in a similar manner as the following constrained optimiza-
tion, where zij denotes the actual amount of information flow on edge (i, j) and xý )
denotes the underlying amount of information flow on edge (i, j) that is useful to sink
node t:
minimize F (Iu, v)
subject to zij = p, Vi = a,
zij x ) ,  V (i,j) E E, t E T, (3.1)4)- (t) (t) viE, t T,
{(i,j)EE} {(j,i)EE}
di2 > x ) >0, V(i,j) EE, tET,
where:
II = cijzij,
{(i,j)EE}
v = Pr [H (nterest I apped) = 0] ,
rp if i = a,
a•) 
-rp if i = t,
0 otherwise.
(a) (b) (c)
(1,1,1
Figure 3.1:: Example showing that network vulnerability depends on the network
code. (a) Values of (zij,x•) ,x( 2)). (b) Network code I. (c) Network code II.
One difficulty of this optimization is that, while it is easy to compute p given x• )
and zij, the same is not true for v, as it depends on the actual processes sent along
the links (i.e. the network code).
As an example, consider the network shown in Figure 3.1, with p = 1, 1 =-
{W1, W2 } = {Xi,X 2},interest = {W 1 } = {X 1}. Figure 3.1(a) shows the values of
x) and zij, while Figures 3.1(b) and 3.1(c) show two possible network codes utilizing
the values of x ) and zij shown in Figure 3.1(a).
Consider the network code used in Figure 3.1(b). Here, we see that the tapping
of any one edge in the set {(s, 1), (1, 3), (1, ti)} will allow the retrieval of the message
in Zinterest. However, for the network code in Figure 3.1(c), this message can only
be fully retrieved when the wiretapper taps two or more edges carrying different
messages.
For the sake of illustration, let us calculate the network vulnerabilities for the two
networks shown in Figures 3.1(b) and (c), assuming that pij = p = 0.01 V (i,j) E E.
Then, we let Xi denote the event that message Xi is not tapped from the network,
and Xi denote the event that it is successfully tapped. Denoting the vulnerabilities
of the two networks in Figures 3.1(b) and (c) as v(b) and v(c) respectively, it follows
that:
(b) =1 - Pr (Xi 1 - Pr( 2 ) Pr (X+X 2 )]
= 1 - (1 - p)3 . [1 - (1 - (1 - p)3).(1 p) 3)]
= 0.0306.
v() = 1 - IPr X, + X2 Pr XX - X2) Pr(X2)
= 1-Pr (X1 + X2).Pr (Xi- X 2).Pr (X2)
+ Pr Xi -+X 2) Pr (Xi - X 2) Pr(X 2 )
+ Pr (X + X 2) Pr (X - X2 Pr X 2 )]
=1 - [(1 - p)9 + 3 x (1 - p)x x (1 - (1 -p)3)]
= 0.0026 # vi.
Thus, we see that the network vulnerability depends not only on the values of x 2)
and zij, but also on the actual network code.
Another difficulty is that v and F (p, v) may not be convex functions of xý) and
zij. For instance, let us return to the network shown in Figure 3.1(b), where we
now assume that every edge has a capacity of two. In addition, for each edge in the
set {(s, 1), (1, tj), (s, 2), (2, t2)}, we now transmit a new message X3 in an uncoded
fashion, in addition to the original message that it has been transmitting. As the
knowledge of X3 does not help the wiretapper in knowing the identity of X 1, the
increases in zij for these edges do not affect v.
As a result of these difficulties with the general solution, we turn towards heuristic
methods to solve the problem.
3.4 First heuristic
Our first heuristic is motivated by the special scenario where all the input processes
are generated at a single source node. In this scenario, there is a high probability
that all the processes in Y will be a linear combination of all rp input processes of
X. Thus, in order for the wiretapper to retrieve the processes in Xinterest, there is
a high probability that he will need to retrieve all rp degrees of freedom in order to
invert the coding matrix.
In this light, we formulate our first heuristic, which is an exact solution to the
problem when the following statements are true.
1. Every transmitted process in the network is a linear combination of all rp pro-
cesses in X. Mathematically, we have:
rp
Y(l') = ,,,ix, V l' e E',
i=1
where:
(1,,j E F2\{0}, V l' E E', 1 < i < rp.
2. The tapping of any n links in E' by the wiretapper will provide him with a set
of min(rp, n) linearly independent equations in terms of the processes in X.
While these two statements are not true in general, they can be reasonable approx-
imations to the actual network code when the processes are well-mixed throughout
the network, and when the finite field used for coding is very big.
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the difficulties associated with the
general solution is that the network vulnerability is not a function of only zx ) and
zij, but is dependent on the actual network code as well. However, when the above
two conditions hold, the network vulnerability is equal to the probability that the
wiretapper manages to tap at least rp links in E', which is a function of the zij values
only (and is independent of the actual network code). This probability, denoted as
v', can be obtained in the following manner.
Consider a link (i, j) E E that is carrying a flow amount zij E Ro. Since each link
in E' has unit capacity, the number of unit capacity links in E' that correspond to
the link (i, j) is approximately [zij] - the nearest integer to zij. With this, we let Lij
be the discrete random variable denoting the amount of information flow successfully
tapped on link (i, j). As pij is the probability of tapping link (i, j), we have:
Pr(Lij = k) = Pij if k = [zi~],
1 - pij if k= 0.
To avoid confusion in the z-transform domain, we replace the transform variable z
by w, and we write:
n4j(w) = E[wLij]
= pijwlzij] + (1 - pj).
Now, we let Ltotal be the random variable denoting the total amount of information
flow successfully tapped in the whole network. Since edges are assumed to be tapped
independently of one another, we have:
Ltota() = I Lj(w)
(i,j)EE
= Pr(Ltotal = k)wk,
k
and the expression for v' is:
V' = Pr(Ltotal > rp)
rp-1
= 1 - E Pr(Ltotal = k),
k=O
which is an increasing function with respect to each zij, but may not be convex in
nature.
Algorithm 1 below summarizes how to obtain v' from the vector z = (zij). In
the algorithm, kij is the vector of polynomial coefficients of Lij(w) and ktotal is the
vector of polynomial coefficients of Ltotal(w), which is obtained by convolving all the
kij vectors. Note that the symbol * is used to denote the convolution operation.
Algorithm 1: Given z, calculate v'.
With this, we replace the objective function in (3.1) by the function .F(p, v'),
which is a function in terms of zij only. For our simulations, we consider a specific
z• +- [zUi] V (i, j) E E;
for each (i, j) E E do
kij -" zero vector of length (z'j + 1);
if z4 = 0 then
kij[1] ~ 1;
else
kij[1] -pij;
kij[zij + 1] ~ 1 - pij;
end
end
ktotal +- * kij;
{(i,j)EE}
h -- length(ktotal);
h1- ktota ;
j=h-rp+l
form of 'F(I, v'), given by:
'(1ý, v') = V + wi', (3.2)
where w is a non-negative weighting variable that represents the relative importance
of the network vulnerability with respect to the overall network cost.
3.5 Second heuristic
One major drawback of the first heuristic is that the calculation of v' can be com-
putationally intensive, as it requires the calculation of the polynomial coefficients of
Ltotal(w). Because of this complexity, a simpler heuristic is proposed here.
We begin by drawing some insights from the way routed networks provide re-
silience against wiretapping. In traditional routing schemes, when a message needs
to be securely transmitted to its destinations, a dispersive routing scheme is often
used. Aside from providing better information security, other advantages of such a
dispersive routing scheme have also been well investigated in a number of papers [11],
[12], [13], [14].
In such a routing scheme, the secure message will be broken into smaller parts and
all these parts will be sent to the destinations of the original message through several
disjoint paths. Security against wiretapping is increased through the use of these
disjoint paths because, in order for the wiretapper to retrieve the entire message, the
wiretapper will need to tap a link on each path used for data transmission. Thus, as
the number of disjoint paths used increases, the wiretapper will need to tap more links
in order to retrieve the original message, and he will have a decreasing probability of
being able to do so.
As the spreading of information flow across disjoint paths was shown to provide
increased data security against wiretapping in traditional routed networks, it is be-
lieved that is will also provide increased data security in network coding by similar
principles.
For instance, if all the flows are concentrated along a single multicast tree in a
coded network, then Pr(Ltoattl rp) can be quite high, as each used link in the network
is carrying a large amount of flow, and one only needs to tap a few of them to have
LtotaIt rp. However, if the flows are spread out across network links instead, one will
need to tap more network links to have Ltota _ rp. Hence, we expect the network
vulnerability to decrease as information flow is spread across the entire network.
A straightforward method to spread information flow across network links is to
introduce, for each link (i, j) E E, a strictly convex and increasing cost function in
terms of zij. For our simulations, we consider the addition of a quadratic cost function
to each link. Specifically, the objective function in (1) is replaced by the following
function:
11 + WlLquad, (3.3)
where:
=1quad  pij (zij/p)2
{(i,j)EE}
and w' is a non-negative weighting variable that represents the relative importance
of the network vulnerability with respect to the overall network cost. Here, it is
important to note that w : w' in general, because v' < 1, while pLquad • r 2. As it is
much easier to compute iquad than v', this heuristic is easier to implement than the
previous one. Another advantage that this heuristic has is that it can be implemented
in a fully distributed manner as each edge has a strictly convex cost function [6].

Chapter 4
Simulation Results
This chapter details the results obtained from our simulations. The simulation setup
is explained in the first section, before the results and discussions are presented in
the remaining ones. The second section details the general results obtained across
different networks, while the third section discusses the tradeoff relationship between
network cost and network vulnerability. The remaining sections of this chapter discuss
the effects of the different network parameters on the performances of the proposed
heuristics.
4.1 Simulation setup
Our simulations are done using the network topologies made available by the Rock-
etfuel project [15]. For our simulations, we make the simplifying assumption that all
network links have the same probability of being tapped (pij = p, V (i, j) E E).
For each scenario, we first decide on the network parameters, including the number
of input processes to be transmitted (r), the throughput rate for each process (p), the
number of processes of interest to the wiretapper (k) and the number of sink nodes
(ITI). We also decide on the network to be used, which gives us the set of cij values.
We then proceed to run 100 simulations with the above network parameters, and
calculate the mean network cost and network vulnerability. For each simulation, each
source node sw1 is randomly and uniformly chosen from V with replacement, before
each sink node in T is randomly and uniformly chosen from V - S without replace-
ment. During this process, we also ensure that the multicast problem is feasible, by
requiring the presence of at least one path from each source node to each sink node.
Following this, we let p vary from 0 to 0.1, and for each value of p, we proceed to
solve for five different multicast subgraphs. We first consider the single path routing
and the multipath routing solutions, before considering the single path network coding
solution by having the objective function in (3.1) as M. Finally, we consider the two
heuristics proposed in the previous chapter.
The objective function to be minimized for each simulation is a weighted sum of
network cost and network vulnerability. In particular, the form of F(y, v) that we
consider is as follows:
where w is a non-negative weighting variable. As for the two proposed heuristics, the
corresponding objective functions have already been given in the previous chapter in
Equations 3.2 and 3.3.
For each subgraph, we estimate the network vulnerability in the following way.
We randomly generate 2000 sets of tapped links based on p, and decide for each set,
if it enables the wiretapper to retrieve all the processes in Ol4nterest. The sample mean
is then taken to be the network vulnerability v.
4.2 General results for various networks
We first consider the applicability of our heuristics across different networks. Specif-
ically, we fix the values for the network parameters r, k, p and ITI, and obtain
the simulation results for four different networks. The four networks used in the
simulations are the Ebone (Europe), Exodus (USA), Telstra (Australia) and Tiscali
(Europe) networks. Although two other network topologies were available from the
Rocketfuel project, they were not used in the simulations. The Sprint network (USA)
was too large for the simulations to be completed in a reasonable time frame, while
the Aboveinet network (USA) did not offer sufficient connectivity between the nodes
for the connection problem to be feasible. Table 4.1 below details the size parameters
of all the six networks whose topologies were available through the Rocketfuel project.
For each of the four networks used in the simulations, we consider the specific
scenario wIhere r = 4, k = 1, p = 10, ITI = 4, w = 3 x 105 and w' = 3 x 103, and
show the results in the rest of this section.
We first, consider the mean network costs for the different methods of information
dissemination. Figures 4.1(a) to 4.1(d) show the plots of the mean network costs (f)
against p.
Table 4.1: Sizes of the six network topologies.
Number of nodes Number of directed
Network (IV|) edges (IEI) El : IVI ratio |Ej : IV12 ratio
Abovenet 141 748 5.30 3.76 x 10-2
Ebone 87 322 3.70 4.25 x 10-2
Exodus 79 294 3.72 4.71 x 10-2
Sprint 315 1944 6.17 1.96 x 10-2
Telstra 108 306 2.83 2.62 x 10-2
Tiscali 161 656 4.07 2.53 x 10- 2
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From Figures 4.1(a) to 4.1(d), we see that the cost of single path coding is always
the lowest, while the cost of multipath routing is always the highest. This is true for
all four networks and for all values of p between 0 and 0.1.
For the two proposed heuristics, we first note that the mean network cost for the
second heuristic is an increasing function in terms of p. This behavior is expected
because as p increases, the heuristic will spread more information flow across the
network from links of lower cost to links of higher cost, resulting in an increase in the
network cost.
However, for the first heuristic, although the network cost first increases with
increasing p when p is small, it starts to decrease or remain the same with increasing
p when p is large. This seemingly odd behavior can be explained as follows.
When p is small, v' can be lowered through the spreading of information flows.
Thus, when p increases, the first heuristic attempts to spread more information flow
across the network to lower v', resulting in an increase in network cost. However,
when p is large, the spreading of information flow no longer offers much benefit in
the lowering of v', and sometimes, may even result in an increase in v' (see below for
a clearer explanation of this phenomenon). Thus, as p increases, the first heuristic
starts to reduce the spreading of information flow to lower network cost and to prevent
a possible increase in v', resulting in a decrease in network cost.
To further explain this queer observation, we shall provide a simple example to
illustrate that the spreading of flows may not always lead to a lowering of v'. Consider
a simple unicast connection problem where five unit entropy rate input messages are
to be transmitted from a source node s to a sink node t. Suppose there are five edge-
disjoint paths between s and t, and each of these disjoint paths is composed of twenty
unit cost edges. We employ network coding and consider two methods of information
dissemination: (1) send all five messages along one of these disjoint paths, and (2)
Table 4.2: Values of v' for the simple example to show that the spreading of flows
does not always decrease v'.
Method v' (p = 0.01) v' (p = 0.1)
(1) Single path coding 0.18 0.88
(2) Multipath coding 0.0034 0.98
send information at unit rate on each of the five disjoint paths (i.e. spread information
flow across the network). For each of the above methods, we consider the value of v',
which is the probability that the wiretapper obtains at least five units of flow from
the network. Table 4.2 shows the values of v' for two different values of p.
From the table, we see that when p = 0.01, the spreading of flows decreases v'
from 0.18 to 0.0034, but when p increases to 0.1, the spreading of flows across the five
disjoint paths increases v' from 0.88 to 0.98 instead. This shows that the spreading
of information flow across the network does not always decrease v'.
Next, we consider the mean network vulnerabilities for the different methods of in-
formation dissemination. Figures 4.2(a) to 4.2(d) show the plots of the mean network
vulnerabilities (v) against p.
From the figures, we first note that the strategy that yields the highest network
vulnerability is always the single path routing strategy, followed by the single path
coding one. In addition, when p is small, the two proposed heuristics have very similar
network vulnerabilities and yield lower network vulnerabilities than the multipath
routing strategy. However, when p is large, the multipath routing strategy always
yields the lowest network vulnerability.
When p is small, both proposed heuristics attempt to reduce their network vulner-
abilities through the spreading of information flow. Thus, the similarity in the net-
work vulnerabilities of the two heuristics is not entirely surprising. However, when p
is large, the second heuristic continues to spread information flow across the network,
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while the first heuristic starts to limit the spread of information flow. This results in
the greater deviation in their vulnerability performances as p gets larger.
To understand why the two heuristics have lower network vulnerabilities than
multipath routing when p is small, but higher vulnerabilities when p is large, we return
to the coded network shown in Figure 3.1(b), where the wiretapper is interested in
X1.
When p is very small, we can approximate the situation as one where the wiretap-
per has negligible probability of tapping two or more network links. Thus, the only
way for him to retrieve X1 is by tapping one of the three links that are carrying X 1
in an uncoded fashion. For a similar routing strategy on the network, at least four
network links must be used for the multicast of X1, and the tapping of any one of
these links will enable the retrieval of X 1. Thus, routing results in a higher network
vulnerability than network coding. In general, when p is small, better security is
achieved by network coding as zapped is often small, and the wiretapper is unable to
retrieve enough degrees of freedom to decode Ynterest entirely.
When p is large, the higher network vulnerability of the coding solutions can be
attributed to the fact that there are potentially more ways to retrieve the messages of
interest in a coded network than in a routed one. In routed networks, we first note that
the tapping of links carrying messages outside Xnterest does not help the wiretapper
in the retrieval of the messages in lnterest. However, in coded networks, the tapping
of such links can potentially aid the wiretapper. Consider the network in Figure
3.1(b). Although H(XI I X1 + X 2 ) = H(X 1) > 0 and H(Xi I X 2) = H(X 1) > 0, we
note that H(X1 I {X 1 + X2 ,X 2}) = 0. In general, for coded networks, there are more
ways for the wiretapper to decode the messages in ,nee,,t from 9. This reduces the
security advantage of transmitting encoded messages, and results in the higher values
of v seen in the two heuristics when p is large.
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Next, we consider the objective function F(p, v) = p + wv. Figures 4.3(a) to
4.3(d) show the plots of F(p, v) against p for the four different networks.
From the figures, we note that the shapes of the graphs of Figure 4.3 are very
similar to those of Figure 4.2. This is because w > > p in each case, causing the
influence of v on F(p, v) to predominate over the influence of p on the objective
function.
Finally, we look at the difference between v and v' for the first heuristic for the
four different networks. Figure 4.4 shows the percentage difference between v and v'
(- x 100%) against p.
From the figure, we note that v' is often greater than v, and that the absolute
percentage difference between v and v' is usually less than 30% (with the exception
of the Tiscali network).
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Figure 4.4: Plot of the percentage difference between v and v' against p for four
different networks. (r = 4, p = 10, k = 1, ITI = 4)
Across the networks, we see that the Tiscali network returns the greatest percent-
age difference across the four networks, while the Telstra network usually returns the
lowest. One possible explanation is that the percentage difference is highly dependent
on the network size and density.
From Table 4.1, one can see that the Tiscali network has the highest number of
nodes and edges, but the lowest (EI : IVI2 ratio out of the four tested networks. The
large size and low density of the network may have resulted in a lower probability of
coding across the rp input processes, and a lower probability that every newly tapped
process will give the wiretapper an extra degree of freedom to decode the messages
of interest. Thus, when compared to the other networks, the actual situation for
the Tiscali network deviates more from the scenario where the first heuristic is an
exact solution, resulting in the larger percentage differences observed for the Tiscali
network.
On the other hand, although the Telstra network is similar to the Tiscali network
in terms of density, the Telstra network is much smaller in size. This results in a
lower average number of edges on the shortest path between two nodes, and a higher
probability that every newly tapped process will give the wiretapper an extra degree
of freedom to decode the messages of interest. Thus, when compared to the Tiscali
network, the situation in the Telstra network is more similar to the scenario where
the first heuristic is an exact solution, resulting in the smaller percentage differences
observed for the Telstra network.
4.3 Tradeoff relationship between [ and v
This section discusses the tradeoff relationship between network cost and network
vulnerability. To investigate this relationship, we consider several scenarios and make
use of the first heuristic to minimize v' subject to a cap on the network cost I. For
each scenario, there is a minimum network cost plmin for which the connection is
feasible, and a maximum network cost Imax for which the value of v' is minimized.
As such, when we impose the caps on the network cost, we only need to concern
ourselves with cap values between Imin and Imax~
Figure 4.5 shows the plot of the network vulnerability v against the network cost
p for three different values of p, with p between PImin and /max-
From the figures, we see that the graphs are all decreasing and convex, showing
that the greatest decrease in vulnerability comes from the initial spreading of flows
(that results in the increase in t). In addition, when p is small, a significant decrease
in v can be obtained at the expense of having a higher network cost. In Figures
4.5(a) and (b), we see that a 90% decrease in v can be obtained at the expense of a
30% increase in p. However, at higher values of p, a less significant decrease in v can
be obtained. For instance, from Figure 4.5(c), we see that a 12% decrease in v will
require a 8% increase in p.
As mentioned in the previous section, the plots of F(1I, v) against p are greatly
influenced by the vulnerability v, because of the high value of w used in the sim-
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ulations. As such, to investigate better the relationship between network cost and
network vulnerability as p changes, we make use of the cost-vulnerability product
(Lv). We choose this particular function because it captures the percentage changes
in both IL and v similarly well. Although the use of this function implies the existence
of a linear tradeoff relationship between p and v, we note that the graphs in Figure
4.5 can be reasonably well approximated by piece-wise linear functions (over two
intervals of 1), and thus, the choice of this cost-vulnerability product is reasonable.
Figures 4.6(a) to 4.6(d) show the plots of the cost-vulnerability products against p
for the four networks. From the figures, we first see smaller performance gaps between
the single path strategies and the multipath ones, as compared to the plots of F(y, v)
against p. This observation can be attributed to the higher network costs incurred
by the multipath strategies. This observation is especially evident when p is large,
where we see the proposed heuristics occasionally yielding higher values of yv than
the single path coding strategy. In addition, when p is large, the first heuristic tends
to yield lower values of iv than the second heuristic, because of the lower network
cost incurred by the first heuristic, and the similar network vulnerabilities of the two
heuristics.
Despite these differences between Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.6, we continue to witness
better performances from the proposed heuristics than the multipath routing strategy
for low values of p.
4.4 Effects of varying w on the first heuristic
We first investigate the effects of varying the non-negative weighting variable (w) in
the objective function FY(1 , v). We note that out of the five different methods of data
transmission, only the first heuristic makes use of w to allocate flows in the network.
Thus, we consider only the effects of varying values of w on the performance of the
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Figure 4.6: Plot of Mv against p for four different networks. (r = 4, p = 10, k =
1, ITI = 4) (a) Ebone. (b) Exodus. (c) Telstra. (d) Tiscali.
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Figure 4.7: Plot of the percentage cost and vulnerability differences between the
first heuristic and the single path coding strategy against p for varying values of w.
(Exodus network, with r = 4, p = 10, k = 1, ITI = 4)
first heuristic.
We look at the effect of w on the network cost (IL) and the network vulnerability
(u) yielded by the first heuristic through a comparison with the corresponding values
yielded by the single path coding (SPC) strategy. Figure 4.7(a) shows the plot of the
percentage cost difference between the two strategies against p for different values of
w between 3 x 103 and 3 x 106, while Figure 4.7(b) shows the corresponding plot of
the percentage vulnerability difference between the two strategies.
From Figure 4.7, we observe that as w increases, the percentage cost difference
increases, while the percentage vulnerability difference decreases. This observation is
expected because as w increases, more emphasis is placed on the network vulnerability
than on the network cost in the objective function to be minimized. As a result, in
order to minimize the function p + wv', the first heuristic will reduce v' at the expense
of increasing p.
Another observation is that greater changes are observed in the cost and vulnera-
bility differences when w increases from a small value, than when it increases from a
large one. Greater changes in the two differences are also observed when p is small,
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Figure 4.8: Plot of the percentage cost and vulnerability differences between the
second heuristic and the single path coding strategy against p for varying values of
w'. (Exodus network, with r = 4, p = 10, k = 1, ITI = 4)
than when p is large. The main reason for these observations is that when w or p is
large, wv' becomes much greater than [, and the objective function P + wv' starts
to approximate wv'. Thus, any further increase in the value of w will not have much
effect on the way flows are allocated across the network, and the network cost does
not change much.
4.5 Effects of varying w' on the second heuristic
We go on to investigate the effects of w' on the second heuristic. Figure 4.8(a)
shows the plot of the percentage cost difference between the second heuristic and
the single path coding strategy against p for different values of w' between 3 x 102
and 3 x 104, while Figure 4.8(b) shows the corresponding plot of the percentage
vulnerability difference between the two strategies.
From Figure 4.8(a), we observe that as w' increases, the cost of the second heuristic
increases. This is expected because with increasing values of w', an increasing amount
of information flow is spread across the network in order to reduce /quad at the expense
of increasing p.
Another observation is that when w' is equal to 3 x 104, the percentage cost
difference starts to taper off at 37% for increasing values of p. This is also expected
because there is a fundamental limit to the amount of information flow that can be
diverted from low cost paths to high cost ones.
From Figure 4.8(b), we observe that an increase in w' does not usually lead to
a decrease in the vulnerability difference (unlike what we have observed for the first
heuristic in the previous section, where an increase in w tends to decrease the vulner-
ability difference). In addition, from the figure, we observe that when w' is equal to
3 x 104, the vulnerability difference actually becomes positive for values of p larger
than 0.09, indicating that the second heuristic starts to yield a higher network vul-
nerability than the single path coding strategy.
The explanation for this observation is that when p is small, the spreading of flows
reduces the probability that the adversary is able to tap a large number of messages
from the network. Thus, as w' increases, the size of the set tapped generally decreases,
making it harder for the wiretapper to decode the messages in /4nterest. This causes
the vulnerability difference to become increasingly negative as w' increases.
However, when p is large, an increase in the spreading of information flow no
longer significantly decreases the probability that the adversary is able to tap a large
number of messages from the network. (Recall in Section 4.2, when p is large, the
spreading of flows no longer decreases v' significantly, resulting in the decreasing
network cost of the first heuristic as p increases.) Instead, a second consequence of
the spreading of flows starts to take effect, whereby more opportunities for coding
across the messages are created. This results in an increase in the probability that
every newly tapped process will give the wiretapper an additional degree of freedom
to decode the messages in ,nterest. Thus, the greater spreading of flows, resulting
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Figure 4.9: Plot of the percentage change of v against p as r increases from 2. (Exodus
network, p = 10, k = 1, ITI = 4.)
from the increase in w', starts to increase the network vulnerability when p is large.
4.6 Effects of varying r
As mentioned earlier, although we do not explicitly consider the possibility of in-
creasing network security at the expense of increased network cost by introducing
additional messages into the network, we can still investigate the effects of the intro-
duction of these additional messages by keeping k constant while increasing the value
of r.
Figure 4.9 shows the plot of the percentage change in v for the first heuristic (as
compared to the reference case where r = 2, w = 1.5 x 105), as the value of r varies.
The values of w were appropriately scaled to compensate for the higher values of Y
with increasing r.
From the figure, we observe that, when r increases from 2 to 6, v decreases,
but when r increases further to 12, v does not decrease anymore. On the contrary,
v increases for small values of p when r = 12. This interesting behavior may be
explained as follows.
When r increases, it affects the network vulnerability in several ways. First, the
mean number of encoded processes Xi in the transmitted processes Y(l') grows as
O(r). This decreases v as the wiretapper will, on average, need to retrieve more
degrees of freedom from the network in order to decode all the messages in Ynterest-
Second, the size of 9 grows as O( 2r), increasing the number of ways Ynterest can be
decoded from the messages in 9, thus increasing v. Finally, the average amount of
flow on the network links grows as O(r). Thus, for any fixed p, the expected size of
tapped increases, and v increases.
As the increase in r can affect the network vulnerability in these different ways,
the net effect of an increase in r on v is ambiguous. However, the simulation results
suggest that when r is small, an increase in r decreases v, while for larger values of
r, an increase in r increases v. This is probably due to the different growths of the
network parameters mentioned in the previous paragraph. As the size of Y grows as
O( 2r), when r is small, the growth of 9 is small, and the net effect of an increase
in r is a decrease in v. However, when r gets large, the growth of V becomes much
larger, resulting in a net increase in v.
4.7 Concluding remarks
From the results obtained through the simulations, we see that when the network
links are not too susceptible to being tapped (i.e. p is small), our proposed heuristics
can provide lower values of network cost and network vulnerability than multipath
routing. However, when p is large, our heuristics yield lower costs, but higher vul-
nerabilities than multipath routing. Despite the poorer vulnerability performance, it
is important to note that the primary aim of this research work is to keep both the
network cost and the network vulnerability low. Thus, there may be times where the
poorer vulnerability performance by the heuristics may be more than outweighed by
their better cost performance.
Our results have also shown that the heuristics are rather robust to changes in
network parameters such as the network sizes, the number of input messages, and
the non-negative weighting variables w and w'. In particular, we note that the first
heuristic is often more robust than the second heuristic to changes in the network
parameters.
Finally, we will like to point out several ways in which the performances of the
heuristics can be improved or be made more robust. First, the vulnerability perfor-
mance of the heuristics can be improved through changes that decrease the number
of ways the messages in interest can be decoded from 'Y. These changes include
the reduction of the size of the finite field over which the coding is to be done, and
the use of deterministic codes, although these changes often bring with them other
undesirable consequences. For instance, a reduction in the finite field size inevitably
reduces the probability that the messages in i can be successfully decoded at the
sink nodes.
Second, as both our proposed heuristics are currently unaffected by changes in
the values of k, IVI and EJl, improvements can be made to them to improve their
performances in different situations. Taking the first heuristic for instance, instead of
defining v' to be the probability that at least rp network processes are tapped, it can
be defined as the probability that at least rpf(k) processes are tapped, where f(k) is
an increasing and possibly concave function of k.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
In this thesis, we have considered the problem of providing a set of connections at
both a low cost and a high level of security against wiretapping. As an exact solution
is difficult, we have presented two heuristic methods of finding the coding subgraphs
that can achieve this. Through our simulation results, we observe that a trade-
off between network cost and network vulnerability also exists in coded networks.
In addition, we observe that network coding can be more effective than traditional
routing for low cost and secure data multicast, especially when the links are not too
easily tapped.
In this study, we have focused on the problem of finding the coding subgraph, and
conducted our simulations in a centralized manner. However, it should be noted that
the finding of the coding subgraph can done in a decentralized manner for the second
heuristic that we have proposed, since it has a strictly convex cost function for each
network link [6]. As we have assumed the use of a random linear network code, which
itself is implementable in a distributed manner, we conclude that our second heuristic
solution to the problem can be implemented in an entirely decentralized manner.
As we have only considered the issue of resilience against wiretapping in this
work, future research can be done to investigate the other security issues of network
coding. Furthermore, as we have only suggested two simple heuristic approaches
to the problem, alternate algorithmic approaches remain as clear avenues for future
work.
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